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Impact Fees in Pennsylvania
Vance G. Camisa*
INTRODUCTION
Impact fees are fees fixed by a specific formula charged to devel-
opers by a municipality prior to the issuance of required approvals
and/or permits.' The policy supporting such fees is that each new
development should pay its share of the impact on the infrastruc-
ture, public services and facilities of the municipal body.'
Some states have adopted legislation specifically authorizing the
imposition of impact fees.3 Other states, in the absence of legisla-
tion expressly authorizing impact fees, have implied the authority
* Attorney, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. B.A. 1983, J.D.
1988, University of Pennsylvania. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assis-
tance of D.D. Hendley, L.L. Deppe and D.A. Midash, and indebtedness for insightful cri-
tique from Charles W. Campbell Jr., Esq..
1. See Netter, Dilworth, Local Government Exactions from Developers, 1 Prac Real
Est Law 23, 29 (1985); Robert L. Weinberg, A Primer on Acceptable Development Fees,
Prob & Prop (Jan./Feb 1989) at 6, 8 ("Weinberg, Primer"); David W. Sweet, Lee P. Symons,
Pennsylvania's New Municipalities Planning Code: Policy, Politics and Impact Fees, 94
Dickinson L Rev 61, 82-83 (1989) ("Sweet and Symons, Planning Code").
Impact fees should be distinguished from exactions, the latter of which are not fixed
charges, but are subject to negotiation. See Weinberg, Primer at 8; Sweet and Symons,
Planning Code at 83.
2. See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The De-
veloper's Perspective, 20 Urban Law 515, 522 (1988) ("Taub, Exactions").
3. See, for example, Taub, Exactions at 518-19 (cited in note 2) (discussing Florida
legislation endorsing impact fees); Rita Setta, Negotiations Ensue over Impact Fees Flap,
Phila Bus J, at 16B (Nov 13-19, 1989) ("Setta, Negotiations") ("[I]mpact fee legislation has
been passed in ... Florida, Virginia, California, Vermont, Texas, Maine, Oregon and Wash-
ington."); Brian W. Blaesser, Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The "Second Genera-
tion", 38 Washington U J Urban & Contemp L 55, 71 n 50 (1990) (identifying impact fee
legislation in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Texas and Vermont).
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for such fees from home rule provisions. 4 Still other states have
invalidated impact fees not expressly authorized by either state
statute or constitution.5
Although impact fees are relatively new to Pennsylvania,' they
appear to have rapidly proliferated. Developers and municipalities
remain at odds as to the propriety of these fees. As municipalities
feel the effect of cuts in federal and state funding, developers are
being asked to pay for an expanded array of projects including
parks, fire equipment, street lights, curbs, recreation centers and
libraries.' Developers, in reaction to this increased burden, have
begun to challenge the authority of the municipalities to charge
impact fees. Because the added costs are passed on to the new
home buyer, builders "contend that new-home buyers end up pay-
ing twice for municipal services: through their taxes and the in-
flated cost of their home."9
This Article shall examine existing Pennsylvania impact fee leg-
islation and three recent court decisions that squarely address the
question of impact fees, in an effort to clarify the parameters of
impact fees in Pennsylvania.
4. See, for example, Taub, Exactions at 526, n 27 (cited in note 2) (discussing im-
pact fees in Wyoming, Utah, Ohio, and Colorado).
5. See, for example, Id at 525 n 61.
6. Reserve Co. of Pennsylvania v Manheim Township Bd. of Comm'rs, 72 Lancaster
L Rev 61, 65 (CP Lancaster Co 1990) ("Manheim II').
7. Cf., Joe Ferry, Is It New Or Revised? A $50,000 Question, Phila Inquirer, H10
(Horsham Neighbors Section) (Apr 12, 1990) (discussing impact fees in Hatfield Township);
Charles Pukanecz, Developers Sue over 'Illegal' Fees, Phila Inquirer, B3 (Bucks Neighbors
Section) (Feb 15, 1990) (discussing impact fees in Bristol Township); Kathy Boccella, Build-
ers Being Hit to Pay for Local Services, Phila Inquirer, Al (Final Ed) (Jan 29, 1990) (dis-
cussing impact fees in Lower Makefield and Newtown Townships); Kerry Lippincott, Board
Waives $56,000 Fee, Phila Inquirer, C14 (Chester Neighbors Section, Penna ed) (Jan 11,
1990) (discussing impact fees in West Caln Township); Setta, Negotiations (cited in note 3)
(discussing impact fees in Lower Makefield and Newtown Townships).
8. See Boccella, Phila Inquirer, at B3 (cited in note 7); cf., Kenneth B. Bley,
Michael L. Tidus, Developers Get Bad News on Impact Fees, Natl L J 21, 24 (Jan 18, 1993)
("As long as politicians view exactions imposed on new developments as politically palat-
able, new and increased exactions are likely to result.").
9. Id; David F. Sheppard Jr., Impact-Fee Bill Maligned Unfairly, Phila Inquirer, 8-
A, col 5 (Editorials) (Oct 2, 1990) ("Who is the loser here? The home buyer, of course.");
Manheim II, 72 Lancaster L Rev at 72 ("Through the imposition of impact fees the cost of
housing could conceivably be driven to levels beyond ... low cost housing .... ); Gus
Bauman, William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of Ameri-
can Practices, 50 L & Contemp Probs 51, 54 (1987) (discussing the "double taxation
problem").
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I. IMPACT FEES FOR RECREATIONAL FACILITIES
The recreational facilities provisions of the Pennsylvania Munic-
ipalities Planning Code (the "MPC")' 0 provided, until very re-
cently, the only specific legislative authority for the imposition of
impact fees in Pennsylvania."1 Section 10503(11), with respect to
permissible contents of subdivision and land development ordi-
nances, provides:
Provisions requiring the public dedication of land suitable for the use in-
tended; and, upon agreement with the applicant or developer, the construc-
tionof recreational facilities, the payment of fees in lieu thereof, the private
reservation of the land, or a combination, for park or recreation purposes as
a condition precedent to final plan approval, provided that:
(ii) The ordinance includes definite standards for determining. . the
amount of any fee to be paid ....
(iii) The. . .fees. . . are to be used only for the purpose of providing
park or recreational facilities accessible to the development.
(v) The. . .fees to be paid shall bear a reasonable relationship to the
use of the park and recreational facilities by future inhabitants of the
development or subdivision.
(vi) A fee authorized under this subsection shall, upon its receipt by a
municipality, be deposited in an interest-bearing account, clearly
identifying the specific recreation facilities for which the fee was re-
ceived.. . . Funds from such accounts shall be expended only in prop-
erly allocable portions of the cost incurred to construct the specific
recreation facilities for which the funds were collected.
(vii) Upon request of any person who paid any fee under this subsec-
tion, the municipality shall refund such fee, plus interest accumulated
thereon from the date of payment, if the municipality had failed to
utilize the fee paid for the purposes set forth in this section within
three years from the date such fee was paid.
(viii) No municipality shall have the power to require the construction
of recreational facilities or the dedication of land, or fees in lieu
thereof, or private reservation except as may be provided by statute."1
This statute empowers municipalities to impose recreation im-
pact fees on developments, although, strictly speaking, the fees are
fees in lieu of dedication of land.13 The option with respect to the
10. 53 Pa Stat §§ 10101-11006-A (Purdon 1972 & Supp 1992).
11. For a more thorough discussion see notes 101-104 and accompanying' text; Sweet
and Symons, Planning Code at 88-89 (cited in note 1) (discussing recreation impact fees
under the MPC).
12. 53 Pa Stat § 10503(11).
13. Although this statute may be more properly characterized as a fee-in-lieu-of-dedi-
cation, because the courts have treated such fees as impact fees, see note 104 and accompa-
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manner in which the municipality shall be compensated is left to
the developer." If the developer opts to pay the impact fee, the
ordinance, pursuant to which the fee is imposed, must set forth
"specific standards" with regard to the setting of the fee and the
fees must be reasonably related to the use of the recreational facili-
ties by the development.1 5 The development must have access to
the recreational facility."' Once received by the municipality, the
funds must be segregated, and used for the recreational facility at
issue within three years or refunded to the developer.
17
Thus, impact fees are permitted in the narrow circumstance of
recreational facilities,18 and even then, within relatively strict and
exacting parameters. More recent legislation authorizes the imposi-
tion of impact fees with respect to a broader and more fundamen-
tal area of impact - transportation. Part II of this Article shall
analyze this new impact fee authorization and the standards appli-
cable with respect to it.
II. TRANSPORTATION IMPACT FEES
Section 10503-A(a) of the MPC provides:
The governing body of each municipality other than a county, in accordance
with the conditions and procedures set forth in this act, may enact, amend
and repeal impact fee ordinances and, thereafter, may establish, at the time
of municipal approval of any new land development or subdivision, the
amount of an impact fee for any of the off-site public transportation capital
improvements authorized by this act as a condition precedent to final plat
approval under the municipality's subdivision and land development
ordinance.19
Not only does Article V-A of the MPC, the Municipal Capital
Improvement Article (the "MCI Article"), authorize the imposition
nying text, the distinction for purposes of this Article is one without meaning. Cf., John J.
Delaney, Larry A. Gordon, Kathryn J. Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for
Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 L & Contemp Probs
139, 142-43 (1987) ("The user impact fee is similar to the exaction in-lieu-fee[;] . . . Courts
have treated user impact fees in a fashion similar to that commonly accorded in-lieu exac-
tion fees.").
14. See 53 Pa Stat § 10503(11).
15. 53 Pa Stat § 10503(11)(ii).
16. 53 Pa Stat § 10503(11)(v).
17. 53 Pa Stat § 10503(11)(vi), (vii).
18. See notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
19. 53 Pa Stat § 10503-A(a). The MPC defines an "impact fee" as "a charge or fee
imposed by a municipality against new development in order to generate revenue for the
funding costs of transportation capital improvements necessitated by and attributable to
new development." 53 Pa Stat § 10502-A(a).
Vol. 31:455
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of impact fees, it also specifically prohibits the imposition by any
municipality of construction, dedication or payment of any off-site
improvements or capital expenditures of any nature, or any contri-
bution in lieu thereof, any exaction fee, or any connection or tap-
ping fee, except as specifically authorized by the MPC.
20
Prior to the adoption of any impact fee ordinance, the munici-
pality would be required to prepare and adopt a transportation
capital improvements plan.2 ' An impact fee advisory committee,
responsible for the preparation of the plan, must be formed, con-
sisting of between seven and fifteen members, forty percent of
which must be representatives of the real estate, commercial and
residential development, and building industries.2 Alternatively,
the municipality may designate the municipal planning commis-
sion as the impact fee .advisory committee.23 The plan must be
based partially upon land use assumptions with respect to future
growth and development, to be developed by the advisory commit-
tee.2' Prior to the issuance of a written report with respect to the
land use assumptions, the advisory committee must hold a public
hearing.
2 5
Once the land use assumptions have been adopted by the munic-
ipality, the advisory committee must prepare a roadway sufficiency
analysis, which should include all highways, streets and roads that
would be impacted by future development.2 6 The analysis should
address the existing levels of sufficiency and preferred levels of ser-
vice, and identify existing deficiencies that must be remedied to
accommodate existing traffic.2 7
The projects to be considered for inclusion in the capital im-
provement plan should be identified by the advisory committee on
the basis of the land use assumptions and roadway sufficiency
analysis.28 Among the components to be included in the plan are:
(i) a specification of the road improvements attributable to the
20. 53 Pa Stat § 10503-A(b).
21. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(a).
22. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(b)(1)-(2).
23. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(b)(3). If the planning commission does not include the 40%
industry representatives, a sufficient number of ad hoc voting members from the industries'
ranks shall be appointed and serve when the planning commission acts in its capacity as the
impact fee advisory committee. Id.
24. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(c)(1).
25. Id. Upon completion but prior to the adoption of the capital improvements plan,
the advisory committee should hold another public hearing. See 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(e)(3).
26. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(d)(1).
27. Id.
28. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(e)(1).
1993
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projected future development; (ii) the projected costs of providing
necessary road improvements attributable to projected future de-
velopment; and (iii) the anticipated revenue from impact fees. 29
The estimated revenue from each individual capital improvement
to be provided from impact fees must be separately identified for
each project.30
Impact fees may not be used to fund projects to remedy existing
deficiencies or improvements attributable to forecasted pass-
through traffic.3 1 Further, impact fees may not be used to fund
more than fifty percent of the total cost of improvements to state
highways.
32
The MCI Article, then, calls for detailed analyses and research,
culminating in reports, recommendations and public hearings,
prior to the adoption of impact fee ordinances. Further, the devel-
oper's perspective would not be lost in the process because of the
forty percent representation requirement." The measure of control
imposed by the MCI Article on municipalities that desire to enact
impact fee ordinances would not vanish upon the adoption of such
an ordinance, but, rather would be maintained with respect to the
administration thereof.
The MCI Article requires that a per trip cost for transportation
improvements within a subject service area be derived by dividing
the total cost of road improvements in the capital plan (attributed
to and necessitated by new development), by the number of antici-
pated peak hour trips generated by all new development.3 4 In turn,
the specific impact fee for a given new development would be de-
termined by multiplying the per trip cost by the estimated number
of trips to be generated by the new development." Further, the
municipality would be required to include, with its impact fee ordi-
nance, boundary descriptions and fee schedules for each of the ser-
vice areas covered by the ordinance. 6
The fees actually collected under the ordinance must be placed
in an interest bearing account designated solely for impact fees,
and the account must clearly identify the transportation service
29. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(e)(1)(iii), (iv)(C), and (vi).
30. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(e)(1)(vi).
31. 53 Pa Stat § 10504-A(e)(2).
32. Id.
33. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
34. See 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(a)(1).
35. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(a)(2).
36. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(b).
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area from which that fee was received.3 7 Funds collected from a
specific service area must be spent in that same service area.3 Ad-
ditionally, a developer would receive a credit towards impact fees
in an amount equal to the fair market value of land dedicated by
the developer for future rights-of-way, alignment or widening of
roads, and for the value of any road construction, called for under
the capital improvements plan, performed by the developer.3 9
Finally, impact fees already collected would be refundable under
certain circumstances, including upon the termination or comple-
tion of a plan where undisbursed funds remain,4 ° and if the munic-
ipality fails to commence construction of road improvements
within three years of the scheduled construction date.41
In sum, while empowering municipalities to charge impact fees,
the MCI Article also provides a rigorous and strict series of stan-
dards and procedures that must be met and followed by a munici-
pality as a requisite to justifying and properly adopting and en-
forcing an impact fee ordinance.
37. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(d). This requirement is similar to the segregation of funds
required with respect to recreational facilities impact fees. See note 12 and accompanying
text.
38. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(d).
39. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(f).
40. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(g)(1).
41. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(g)(2). House Bill 1361, HR 1361, Session of 1989 (Printer's
No 3942) (the bill that became the MCI Article) along with a companion bill, see HR 444,
Session of 1989 (Printer's No 3941), received the unanimous vote of the Pennsylvania House
on October 2, 1990. See Enda, House Backs Bill on Setting of Impact Fees, Phila Inquirer,
at 6-B, col 1 (Oct 3, 1990).
House Bill 444, which amends the Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, provides for the
imposition of various fees, including tapping fees and connection fees. See HR 444 at § 4(T).
The connection fee may not exceed the actual cost of connecting the subject property to the
municipality's main. See id at § 4(T)(1)(I). A customer facilities fee may be charged in the
instance where the municipality (not the developer/property owner) installs the customer
facilities. See id at § 4(T)(1)(II). The fee may not exceed the actual cost of facilities serving
the subject property. Id.
The tapping fee, which comes the closest to an impact fee, may only be imposed upon
resolution by the municipality stating the fee. See id at § 4(T)(1)(III). The tapping fee may
consist of the following components: a capacity part, which may not exceed the cost of the
same (including facilities that shall provide future service), and which must be included in a
duly adopted annual budget or a 5-year capital improvements plan, id at § 4(T)(1)(III)(A);
and a distribution (or collection) part, which may not exceed the cost of distribution or
collection facilities required to provide service (including such facilities that shall provide
future service, not to exceed the reasonable estimated cost), and which per unit of capacity
fee of capacity required by the new customer should not exceed the cost of the facilities
divided by this design capacity. Id at § 4(T)(1)(III)(B).
The tapping fees may not include the cost of expanding, replacing, updating or upgrading
existing facilities serving existing customers in order to meet stricter standards or to provide
better service to existing customers. Id at § 4(T)(1)(III)(E).
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Fundamental to an understanding of the effect of the MCI Arti-
cle is an awareness of the standard required by the MCI Article to
justify a particular impact fee. "The impact fee for transportation
capital improvements shall be based upon the total costs of the
road improvements included in the adopted capital improvement
plan within a given service area attributable to and necessitated
by new development within the service area. . ". . "This standard
appears not to apply to a specific development, but rather appears
to be the standard applicable to all new development in a given
service area taken as a whole. This discrepancy, in and of itself,
weakens any requirement of a specific relationship between an im-
pact fee and a particular development. Nonetheless, an analysis of
how the courts might interpret the phrase "attributable to and ne-
cessitated by new development" is appropriate and would serve to
illumine the probable impact of the MCI Article on developers.
The Pennsylvania courts, when looking to questions of attribu-
tion and necessity under similar circumstances have favored the
so-called rational-nexus test. In Robert Mueller Associates v Zon-
ing Hearing Board, the court observed that "some of the costs of
off-site improvements can fairly be charged to a developer whose
plans so burden existing facilities as to necessitate their acceler-
ated improvement or construction."'Is Following this observation,
the court concluded that the court below had not abused its discre-
tion. In so concluding the court observed that the court below had
applied the rational-nexus test, under which "a developer can only
be forced to 'bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational
nexus to the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the
subdivision.' ",4 Consequently, the commonwealth court, at least
implicitly, has approved the rational-nexus test.
The rational-nexus test consists of two elements. The first, simi-
lar to the "attributable to" language in the MCI Article, requires
that the development upon which the assessment is being imposed
shall have created the need for the additional facility or service."5
The development, however, need not have solely created the
42. 53 Pa Stat § 10505-A(a)(1) (emphasis added).
43. 30 Pa Commw 386, 389, 373 A 2d 1173, 1175 (1977) (emphasis added). For a more
thorough discussion of Mueller, see notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
44. Mueller, 373 A2d at 1175 n 1 (quoting 181 Inc. v'Salem County Planning Bd., 133
NJ Super 350, 358, 336 A2d 501, 506 (Law Div 1975) (quoting Longbridge Builders, Inc. v
Planning Bd., 52 NJ 348, 350, 245 A2d 336, 337 (1968))).
45. Taub, Exactions at 531 (cited in note 2.)
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need.46 The second element, similar to the "necessitated by" lan-
guage in the MCI Article, requires that some benefit accrue to the
subject development with respect to the use of the funds col-
lected.47 The benefit need not accrue solely to the development,
however, but may be enjoyed by the general public as well.4 8
The rational-nexus test lends itself to a breadth of interpreta-
tion. Some states - most notably California-have used the inher-
ent flex in the standard to uphold exactions based upon "the loos-
est possible type of nexus, '49 leading some to equate the rational-
nexus test with the rational-basis test (an equal protection
test)-"a test the government always passes.""0  Still other
states-most notably Florida-have more strictly analyzed the ra-
tional-nexus test.51 This strict interpretation consists of a two-
prong analysis: the first prong calls for a real showing that a need
will be created by the new development and that a proportional
relationship exists between the amount of the fee and the portion
of the need that is attributable to the development; the second
prong requires that the funds collected be earmarked for a use that
would provide some degree of benefit to the development.
52
Inasmuch as one of the goals of an impact fee is a gain in pre-
dictability of the imposition at issue there, a test (such as the ra-
tional-nexus test) allowing for such varied interpretation may de-
feat the purpose. While it is true that a strict interpretation is
available, there is no assurance that the Pennsylvania courts would
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id; see also Netter and Dilworth, Local Government, at 28 (cited in note 1) (citing
Longbridge Builders, Inc. v Planning Bd., 52 NJ 348, 245 A2d 336 (1968)).
49. Burke Bosselman and Nancy E. Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of
Land Development Linkage, 9 Nova L Rev 381, 397 (1985) (Bosselman and Stroud,
"Mandatory Tithes") (citing Liberty v Calif. Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal App 3d 491, 170 Cal
Rptr 247 (1981); J.W. Jones Co. v City of San Diego, 157 Cal App 3d 745, 203 Cal Rptr 580
(1984); and Kalaydjian v City of Los Angeles, 149 Cal App 3d 690, 197 Cal Rptr 149
(1983)).
50. Bosselman and Stroud, Mandatory Tithes at 397; cf., Blue Jeans Equities v City
and County of San Francisco, 3 Cal App 4th 164, 4 Cal Rptr 2d 114 (1992) (ruling that
"heightened scrutiny" does not apply to "regulatory takings" under San Francisco's Transit
Impact Development Fee Ordinance and upholding the requirement that the developer pay
an impact fee of over $3.1 million for municipal railway to offset anticipated costs of in-
creased ridership generated by the new construction).
51. See Lawrence A. Levy, Impact Fees, Concurrency, and Reality: A Proposal for
Financing Infrastructure, 21 Urban Law 471, 479 & n 27 ("Levy, Impact Fees"); Bosselman
and Stroud, Mandatory Tithes at 397 (cited in note 49).
52. Bosselman and Stroud, Mandatory Tithes at 397-98 (cited in note 49); see also




not reduce the test to no more than "a slogan used to justify any
currently popular municipal policy." 3 Such an interpretation
would effectively nullify the otherwise strict requirements of the
MCI Article.
A Senate Bill, 54 similar in some respects to the House Bill that
resulted in the MCI Article, would have specifically authorized the
imposition of impact fees with respect to street improvements and
water sewer line extensions. The Senate Bill, however, employed a
more rigorous standard required to justify a particular impact fee.
The Senate Bill would have required that "such off-site improve-
ments are necessitated by and specifically and uniquely attributa-
-ble to such subdivision or land development or improvements
within such subdivision or land development."55 Similarly, the fee
authorized for off-site street improvements would have been lim-
ited to the "percentage [of the overall cost] that the peak traffic
specifically and uniquely attributable to the subdivision or land
development bears to the maximum peak traffic capacity of such
street improvements at the level of service existing prior to the
proposed subdivision or land development.""
Therefore, whereas the MCI Article relies upon the rational-
nexus test, the Senate Bill would have employed the specifically
and uniquely attributable test.5 7 This latter test is a stricter one
and one less capable of becoming a standard without meaning -
the impact at issue must be specifically and uniquely attributable
to the development upon which the imposition of a fee is sought.
A. Analysis of the "Specifically and Uniquely Attributable"
Standard
Although not the majority standard,58 a number of states have
applied the specifically and uniquely attributable standard (the
"SUA standard") in the arena of exactions.59
53. Bosselman and Stroud, Mandatory Tithes at 397 (cited in note 49).
54. S 923, Session of 1989 (Printer's No 1052).
55. S 923 at § 509(n) (emphasis added).
56. Id at § 509(q) (emphasis added).
57. It should be noted that the Senate Bill standard applies to the specific develop-
ment at issue, rather than to development in general, as with the MCI Article. See text
following note 42.
58. See Taub, Exactions at 529 (cited in note 2).
59. States adopting the SUA standard not specifically discussed in this Article in-
clude Connecticut. See Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v Planning Comm'n of the Town of
Danbury, 27 Conn Super 74, 77, 230 A2d 45, 47 ("[Tlhe developer may be required to as-
sume those costs which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which
464 Vol. 31:455
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In Rosen v Village of Downers Grove, 0 the Supreme Court of
Illinois addressed a challenge to the validity of a subdivision ordi-
nance requiring, inter alia, the dedication of at least one acre of
land for public use for every 75 family living units, as well as an
amount of land "deemed necessary" for educational facilities.61
The developer there was asked to pay $325.00, for each lot sold, for
the benefit of the school districts. The court stated that "the devel-
oper of a subdivision may be required to assume those costs which
are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity . "...62
The court cited as an example that "[tihe distinction between per-
missible and forbidden requirements . . . is that the municipality
may require the developer to provide the streets which are re-
quired by the activity within the subdivision but can not [sic] re-
quire him to provide a major thoroughfare, the need for which
stems from the total activity of the community." ' The court
found, inter alia, that the $325.00 amount arrived at by the board
of education was based upon factors totally unrelated to the subdi-
vision. 4 Consequently, the court held that the circuit court's en-
joining such charges was correct.
6 5
The language and analysis used by the court in Rosen demon-
strates that the SUA standard is a more difficult one to meet than
the rational-nexus test. In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v Vil-
lage of Mount Prospect," the court followed the standards that it
had laid down in Rosen. In Pioneer, the court was faced with an
ordinance calling for the dedication (for public grounds) of (i) one
acre for every 60 residential building sites (or family living units),
or (ii) one-tenth of an acre for every one acre of business or indus-
trial building sites."7 The land sought to be dedicated was for the
use of an elementary school. While the court recognized "the obvi-
ous fact that the orderly development of a municipality must nec-
essarily include a consideration of the present and future need for
would otherwise be borne by the public.").
60. 19 Ill 2d 448, 167 NE2d 230 (1960).
61. Rosen, 167 NE2d at 233.
62. Id.
63. Id at 234.
64. Id. The factors cited include the time lag between the date when homes were
occupied and when taxes were collected on the completed homes. Id.
65. Id. It is interesting to note that the court, in reaching its conclusion, also ob-
served that a portion of the ordinance relating to educational facilities "fixes no standards
whatever to govern the plan commission in determining the amount of land to be dedi-
cated." Id (emphasis added).
66. 22 Ill 2d 375, 176 NE2d 799 (1961).
67. Pioneer, 176 NE2d at 800.
.1993
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school and public recreational facilities," 8 in this instance the
court found that the "record does not establish that the need for
recreational and educational facilities ... is one that is specifically
and uniquely attributable to the addition of the subdivision
... ," The court observed that the then-present school facilities
were near capacity, and that that was the result of the total devel-
opment of the community. The court believed that the need for
additional school facilities was caused by the development of the
whole community and the then-current limits of the existing
school facilities. 0 Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment
of the lower court, noting that "the school problem which allegedly
exists here is one which the subdivider should not be obliged to
pay the total cost of remedying ....
Under the rational-nexus standard, such a result would have
been unlikely, as the need was created by the development (albeit
not solely so) and some benefit would have accrued to the develop-
ment (again, albeit not solely). 2 Pioneer serves to demonstrate the
problem with the rational-nexus standard, in that the developer,
under that test, would have been liable for the dedication required
where arguably poor planning and inadequate funding by the mu-
nicipality there created a situation wherein there was no room for
any growth with respect to educational facilities.
Conversely, in Board of Education of School District No. 68 v
Surety Developers, Inc.,73 the court upheld the imposition sought
by the municipality.74 The county board there desired, inter alia,
$200.00 for each home built and occupied in the subdivision. In
contrast to Pioneer, the impact of the subdivision was made clear
by the fact that 98 percent of the schoolchildren in the two ele-
mentary schools in the subdivision (at the time the case was tried)
were from the development at issue. 78 The court further empha-
sized the impact by noting that the developer chose to build in a
rural area, which necessitated the construction of community facil-
ities.7 ' Not surprisingly, the court held that the school problem was
specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer's activity




72. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
73. 63 11 2d 193, 347 NE2d 149 (1975).
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and accordingly that the imposition at issue was in conformity
with the SUA test articulated in Rosen and Pioneer."' Surety De-
velopers, then, serves to demonstrate that the SUA standard can
be met in those instances where the development has truly been
the specific and unique cause of the problem at hand.7
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island adopted the SUA standard
in Frank Ansuini, Inc. v City of Cranston.9 In that case, the court
held that "the involuntary dedication of land is a valid exercise of
the police power only to the extent that the need for the land re-
quired to be donated results from the specific and unique activity
attributable to the developer." 80 Based upon that standard, the
court reasoned that the requirement at issue, a donation of "at
least 7 [percent]" of the land to be developed, was clearly arbitrary
on its face.8'
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reaffirmed the precepts of
the Ansuini holding in J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v Town of Atkin-
son.82 In J.E.D., at issue was a zoning ordinance requiring a sub-
developer to deed 7 1/2 percent of the total acreage of the subdivi-
sion to the municipality.83 Following the reasoning in Ansuini, the
court, in refusing to uphold the exaction and ordering the recon-
veyance of the dedicated parcel, stated that the regulation was "an
arbitrary blanket requirement." 84
The Rhode Island and New Hampshire courts then, have used
the SUA standard to strike down specific percentage requirements,
77. Id.
78. See also Krughofl v City of Naperville, 41 Il App 3d 334, 354 NE2d 489 (1976),
aff'd 68 II 2d 352, 369 NE2d 892 (1977) (stipulation by parties and implicit approval by
court that ordinance requiring, inter alia, dedication of (i) 5.5 acres per 1000 population for
park and recreational purposes and (ii) land for school sites or donation of $15,000 per acre
in lieu of land dedication meets SUA standard).
79. 107 RI 63, 264 A2d 910 (1970).
80. Ansuini, 264 A2d at 914 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. 121 NH 581, 432 A2d 12 (1981).
83. J.E.D., 432 A2d at 13.
84. Id at 15. The court also addressed the requirement that the developer bear the
cost of removing an off-site ledge. The court reasoned:
Unless the traffic has increased as the result of the subdivision, it is not constitution-
ally permissible for the town to require the plaintiff to bear any part of the cost of
removing the ledge. . . . If traffic now is greater than before because of the subdivi-
sion, then the plaintiff can be required to contribute to the cost of removing the
ledge, but only in the proportion that the increased use of the road attributable to
the plaintiff's subdivision bears to the road's total use.




at least in terms of land dedication. Arguably, those courts would
similarly strike down a specific dollar requirement, i.e., an impact
fee. While such a decision might, at first blush, be used to argue
that the standard is too stringent to properly regulate impact fees,
a more thorough analysis proves such an argument to be without
merit.
In both Ansuini and J.E.D., the courts seem to have focused
their attention, with respect to a predetermined percentage, on the
arbitrary nature of the given percentage. In neither decision were
the underlying administrative and procedural requirements for
proper adoption of an ordinance discussed. Those requirements
appear to have been not nearly so thorough as those set forth in
the MCI Article.88 The very arduous nature of the MCI Article re-
quirements would operate to eradicate the presumption of arbi-
trariness with respect to a set dollar figure as an impact fee-the
ordinance would be, in effect, fine-tuned.8
Further, precisely because of the fine-tuned nature of any ordi-
nance adopted under the MCI Article, the SUA standard is more
appropriate than the rational-nexus standard. The many commit-
tees, reports and investigations required pursuant to the MCI Arti-
cle to justify an impact fee lend a presumption of fairness to any
results reached by a municipality thereunder. 7 The developer
squaring off against a municipality armed with such an arsenal of
committees, paperwork and studies, stands little chance of success-
fully challenging an overly burdensome impact fee when the mu-
nicipality need only justify its fee by means of the rational-nexus
standard. The SUA standard, then, represents the logical standard
to be coupled with the MCI Article. Through such a modification
to the MCI Article, the goal of ensuring that each development pay
its fair share, and only its fair share, with respect to its impact on
the community can be reached. Until such time, however, develop-
ers must face the uncertainty that the rational-nexus standard
permits.
The MCI Article explicitly prohibits the imposition of any exac-
tion fee unless "specifically authorized" under the MPC.88 The
question of specific authorization has been addressed by the Penn-
85. See notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
86. See, for example, Ansuini, 264 A2d at 913 ("It seems obvious to us that a fixed
percentage. requirement will inevitably create inequities, which will be less likely to arise
under the specifically and uniquely attributable formula.").
87. See notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
88. 53 Pa Stat § 10503-A(b); see also note 20 and accompanying text.
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sylvania courts (in addition to implied authorization) with respect
to impact fees, in three recent cases. Part III of this Article will
analyze and discuss those three decisions in order to better define
the requirements of specific authorization.
III. THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS ON IMPACT FEES
A. Reserve Co. of Pennsylvania v Manheim Township Board of
Commissioners" ("Manheim I")
In Manheim I, the Reserve Company sought to develop 169 lots
of single family residential homes on 67.7 acres of property in
Manheim Township. 90 The Township had enacted a transportation
impact fee ordinance citing its general police power pursuant to
the MPC."' Compliance with the ordinance would cost the Reserve
Company $2,160.00 per unit.92 As with the recreational impact fee
under the MPC,93 the monies would be placed in a special fund
used to help pay for the cost of construction of or improvement to
township street and highway facilities deemed to be required as a
result of new developments in the township.94
The Reserve Company argued that the impact fee, rather than a
land use ordinance, was a tax revenue ordinance unauthorized
under the MPC. 5 The township contended that the ordinance was
adopted pursuant to Article VI of the MPC,96 which relates to zon-
ing:9" Section 10617.3(e) of the MPC permitted the township to
"prescribe reasonable fees with respect to the administration of a
zoning ordinance . . . ."9 In rejecting the township's argument,
the court stated that "[t]he impact fee enacted is clearly not in-
tended to defray the expenses of administering the zoning ordi-
nance," 99. and concluded that the "defendant does not cite, nor can
89. 71 Lancaster L Rev 555 (CP Lancaster Co 1989).
90. Manheim 1, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 556.
91. Id.
92. Id. The amount was calculated pursuant to a prescribed formula. See Reserve Co.
of Pennsylvania v Manheim Township Bd. of Comm'rs, 72 Lancaster L Rev 61, 63 (CP
Lancaster Co 1990) ("Manheim I").
93. See note 12 and accompanying text; see also note 37 and accompanying text (seg-
regation requirement under MCI Article).
94. Manheim 1, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 557; see also Manheim 11, 72 Lancaster L Rev
at 63.
95. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 557.
96. 53 Pa Stat §§ 10601-10619.1.
97. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 558.
98. 53 Pa Stat § 10617.3(e).
99. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 558.
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we find any provision within Article VI, which either expressly or
by fair implication, authorizes the enactment of any impact fee.""'
In support of its conclusion, the cotirt examined the legislative
history of the MPC. Prior to enactment of the then-current
amendment to the MPC, the legislative bill would have expressly
permitted townships to impose impact fees generally, including
transportation impact fees. 01 That provision, however, had been
dropped from the MPC as then adopted.10 2 The court went on to
note that among the amendments to the MPC, as then currently
adopted, was a provision authorizing recreation impact fees.i0s The
court stated:
We can only conclude that the legislature's action in authorizing municipali-
ties to impose recreation impact fees, when at the same time refusing to
grant them similar authority to enact transportation impact fees is convinc-
ing evidence that municipal authority to enact impact fee ordinances not




The court went on to distinguish the case of Robert Mueller As-
sociates v Zoning Hearing Board.05 In Mueller, the township
granted tentative approval of a Planned Residential Development
("PRD") subject to a number of conditions. 106 The Mueller court
impliedly approved the requirement that the developer pay for the
costs of widening a road and for the off-site costs of installing
water lines and a sewage disposal system.10 7 The authority of the
100. Id; cf., Sweet and Symons, Planning Code at 86-87 (cited in note 1) (no statutory
sanction exists for impact fees, and legislative intent was not to sanction such fees).
101. Manheim 1, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 558. The provision in the bill provided:
The governing body may require a developer, as a condition for approval of a subdivi-
sion or land development, to pay the cost of providing only reasonable and necessary
transportation improvement, water, sewage and drainage facilities, the rights of way
and easements therefore, located outside the property limits of the subdivision or
land development but necessitated or created and required thereby ....
Id at 558-59 n 4 (citation omitted). For a general discussion of the pre-MCI Article legisla-
tive history of the MPC with respect to impact fees, see Sweet and Symons, Planning Code
at 82-97 (cited in note 1).
102. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 558.
103. Id at 559. For a discussion of the recreational impact fee provision, see notes 10-
18 and accompanying text.
104. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 559.
105. 30 Pa Commw 386, 373 A2d 1173 (1977).
106. Mueller, 373 A2d at 1174.
107. The Mueller court was not actually faced with the validity of these charges, as
they were not appealed by the developer. Id. The issue in Mueller was whether the township
should be required to pay the cost of acquiring off-site rights of way. Id. The court decided
against the township and in favor of the developer on that issue. Id at 1175. Consequently,
the analysis of the Manheim I court is inaccurate insofar as that court stated that "[tihe
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township was derived from section 10709(a)(2) of the MPC, 08
which allows a township to impose conditions on a tentative ap-
proval. The Manheim I court noted other provisions of the MPC
that provide similar authority. 10 9
The Manheim I court properly observed, however, that this type
of condition differed in many respects from the impact fee at is-
sue.110 The Manheim I impact fee established, by means of a prior
determination, that every development creates an impact necessi-
tating the payment of a predetermined fee; whereas Mueller ad-
dresses the right of the township to make individual site-specific
determinations pursuant to an express right granted the township
by the MPC."' Simply, the Manheim I court, here, has noted that
the conditions addressed in Mueller were not impact fees by
definition."
2
Commonwealth Court upheld the imposition by a township board of supervisors of a fee
imposed as one of the conditions of approval of a. . .[PRD]." Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L
Rev at 559-60.
108. See Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 560. 53 Pa Stat § 10709(a)(2) (Purdon
Supp 1992) provides: "The governing body, or the planning agency, within 60 days following
the conclusion of the public hearing provided for in this article, shall, by official written
communication, to the landowner, . . . grant tentative approval subject to specified condi-
tions not included in the development plan as submitted . 53 Pa Stat § 10709(a)(2)
(emphasis added).
109. The court cited § 10910.2(b) as authorizing a zoning hearing board to impose
such conditions with respect to the grant of a variance. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at
560. Section 10910.2(b) provides: "In granting any variance, the board may attach such rea-
sonable conditions and safeguards as it may deem necessary to. implement the purposes of
this act and the zoning ordinance." 53 Pa Stat § 10910.2(b) (Purdon Supp 1992)..The court
cited § 10912.1 as authorizing a zoning hearing board to impose such conditions with respect
to the grant of special exceptions. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 560. Section 10912.1
provides: " ... In granting a special exception, the Board may attach such reasonable con-
ditions and safeguards, in addition to these expressed in the ordinance, as it may deem
necessary to implement the purposes of this act and the zoning ordinance." 53 Pa Stat §
10912.1 (Purdon Supp 1992). The court cited § 10913.2 as providing similar authority with
respect to the grant of conditional uses. Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 560. Section
10913.2 provides: " . . . In granting a conditional use, the governing body may attach such
reasonable conditions and safeguards, in addition to those expressed in the ordinance, as it
may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this act in [sic] the zoning ordinance." 53
Pa Stat § 10913.2 (Purdon Supp 1992). Finally, the court cited § 10503(9) as authorizing
such conditions with respect to subdivision and land development approvals. Manheim 1, 71
Lancaster L Rev at 560. Section 10503(9) allows for the inclusion, in a subdivision and land
development ordinance of "[p]rovisions for the approval of a plat... subject to conditions
acceptable to the applicant and a procedure for the applicant's acceptance or rejection of
any conditions which may be imposed ...." 53 Pa Stat § 10503(9) (Purdon Supp 1992).
110. See Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 560.
111. Id.
112. See note 1 and accompanying text.
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The Manheim I court concluded that because the impact fee was
not authorized by the MPC it was not a land use ordinance and
consequently the court, rather than the zoning board, had jurisdic-
tion. " ' The ultimate question of the validity of the ordinance,
however, was not ruled upon by the court. Because "the question
of transportation impact fee ordinance validity is one of first im-
pression in the Commonwealth, [the court was] unwilling to con-
sider the . . . issue on the [then] current briefs of the parties."
1 14
B. Builders Association v Cranberry Township'"
In Builders, an amalgam of developers and builders associations
sought a summary judgment with respect to their challenge of the
validity of a township zoning ordinance.11 6 Under the ordinance,
developers were required to guaranty the payment of impact fees
to be used to finance highway improvements through the year
2000.117 Through a detailed projected costs analysis, the township
arrived at a figure of $91.82 as a unit cost of weekday vehicle
trips." The amount of the fee for any given developer would be
calculated as the product of the average number of weekday trips
to be generated by the development and unit cost per trip." 9 As
with Manheim I, this impact fee is readily distinguishable from the
monetary conditions in Mueller in that this fee was established by
a prior determination that every development would create an im-
pact requiring payment of a predetermined fee (in this instance,
per weekday trip).120
The court stated: "The sole issue before the Court is the author-
ity of the Township to enact an ordinance that requires new devel-
opment (Plaintiffs) to pay impact fees prior to development or
zoning approval." ' As in Manheim I, the township looked to the
MPC as providing the authority to enact the ordinance imposing
the impact fees.12 2 Specifically, the township cited section 10105 of
113. See Manheim I, 71 Lancaster L Rev at 561.
114. Id at 562.
115. 8 Butler County L J, Feb 9, 1990, No 111, 1 (CP Butler Co 1990).
116. Builders, 8 Butler County L J at 1.
117. Id.
118. Id at 2.
119. Id. The average amount of trips generated by each proposed development was
established by the Traffic Engineers Trip Generation Manual (4th ed). Id.
120. See notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
121. Builders, 8 Butler County L J at 3.
122. Id. Additionally, the township cited the Second Class Township Code, 53 Pa Stat
§§ 65101-67605, as providing the authority to impose impact fees.
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the MPC, which, the township argued, allows townships to be flexi-
ble with respect to planning and zoning.""3 Also, the township cited
section 10301, which authorizes the township to prepare, and sets
forth the permissible parameters of, a comprehensive plan.1 2' The
township cited section 10501, which grants the township the au-
thority to regulate subdivisions and land development by means of
a subdivision and land development ordinance, and section 10503,
which delineates the permissible contents of the subdivision and
land development ordinances.1 25 Further, the township cited sec-
tion 10603, which sets forth the permissible parameters of zoning
ordinances, and section 10604, which delineates the purposes of
zoning ordinances. 2 6
The court summarily found that the provisions of the MPC cited
by the township did not specifically empower the township to im-
pose impact fees. 27 The court concurred with the Manheim I court
that Article VI of the MPC did "not expressly or by fair implica-
tion authorize the impact fee. '12'  Also, as did the Manheim I
court, the Builders court looked to the legislative history of the
MPC as support for its position that the specific authority for im-
pact fees was withheld from the MPC.129
The court then turned its attention to the question of whether
the township had the authority to impose impact fees as a function
123. Builders, 8 Butler County L J at 3. Section 10105 of the MPC sets forth the
purpose of the act. 53 Pa Stat § 10105 (Purdon Supp 1992).
124. Builders, 8 Butler County L J at 3.
125. Id. The only impact fees then authorized under this section of the MPC, relate to
recreation impact fees. See notes 10-18, 101-104 and accompanying text.
126. Builders, 8 Butler County L J at 4. Section 10603(c)(2) of the MPC allows a
township to " . . . attach such reasonable conditions and safeguards, in addition to those
expressed in the ordinance, as it may deem necessary to implement the purposes of this act
and the zoning ordinance." 53 Pa Stat § 10603(c)(2) (Purdon Supp 1992). This provision is
similar to those distinguished, by the Manheim I court, from impact fees. See notes 105-112
and accompanying text.
The township also cited the Second Class Township Code as providing the township with
"broad powers to regulate the development, construction, timing and scheduling of road
improvements necessary to serve new development." Builders, 8 Butler County U at 7.
Specifically, the township referred to the following provisions: "53 Pa Stat § 65725 (power to
enact zoning ordinances), § 65729 (power to enact health ordinances), § 65747 (power to
take all means for securing safety of persons or property, including the power to adopt ordi-
nances defining disturbing the peace), § 65762 (general powers), and § 66101 (power to lay
out, open, widen and vacate roads)." Builders, 8 Butler County LJ at 7.
. 127. Id at 4. Additionally, the court found that none of the provisions of the Second
Class Township Code empowered the township to impose impact fees. Id at 7.
128. Id at 6.
129. Id at 7.
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of its general police powers."' 0 The plaintiffs argued that the im-
pact fees were actually taxes and therefore invalid as an exercise of
police powers. 131 As did the Manheim I court,13 1 the Builders court
examined the license/tax dichotomy,' and concluded that because
the magnitude of the impact fees at issue there was far in excess of
the expense of license administration, it was not a valid license fee,
but rather was an invalid tax.134
In sum, then, the court held that the ordinance
was adopted without authority, express or implied, pursuant to the MPC or
the Second Class Township Code. Further ... the magnitude of the impact
fees imposed . . .demonstrates that th[e] [olrdinance [was] adopted under
the guise of a zoning amendment or license [and] is in reality an unautho-
rized, and therefore, invalid tax.3 8
Accordingly, the court found that the township lacked the author-
ity to require the payment of impact fees and declared invalid and
unenforceable any agreements calling for the payment of impact
fees at the time of building permit issuance.
36
C. Reserve Co. of Pennsylvania v Manheim Township Board of
Commissioners3 7 ("Manheim II")
In Manheim II, the Manheim I court, as a result of a motion for
summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, faced the
question that it had left open: "whether the impact fee ordinance
[at issue] was a valid exercise of the Township's police power, the
question of validity turning on whether the impact fee is a tax or a
proper regulatory fee.'
3 8
The court preliminarily determined that specific authority to im-
pose an impact fee pursuant to "clearly defined enabling legislation
must be conferred by the legislature either expressly or by neces-
130. Id at 8. The township cited sections 65725, 65729, 65747, and 65762 of the Second
Class Township Code as authority for the imposition of impact fees pursuant to general
police powers. Id.
131. Id.
132. See notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
133. Builders, 8 Butler County L J at 8-9.
134. Id at 9.
135. Id.
136. Id at 10. The court specifically left open, however, the question of whether the
Transportation Partnership Act preempts townships from imposing impact fees for roadway
improvements. Id.
137. 72 Lancaster L Rev 61 (CP Lancaster Co 1990) ("Manheim II").
138. Manheim II, 72 Lancaster L Rev at 64 (citation omitted); see also note 115 and
accompanying text.
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sary implication. '" 13 9 The township relied on two legislative sources
of authority: the MPC and the First Class Township Code.140 Be-
cause the court, in Manheim I, had already concluded that the
township derived no authority from the MPC, 14' the only remain-
ing issue was whether the police power (pursuant to the First Class
Township Code) provided authority for the subject impact fees or-
dinance. Because Pennsylvania law prohibits taxation pursuant to
the police power, 42 the court focused on whether the impact fee
was a tax or a regulatory fee.
"[T]he crucial difference [between a fee and a tax, according to
the court, is] that a fee is based on the cost to the municipality of
providing some service which is part of its official function,
whereas a tax raises revenues for general government purposes."",3
The revenues raised by the impact fees were to be used for high-
way construction and improvement, rather than the costs of ad-ministration or supervision of the building permit process. 4 4 Fur-
ther, the revenues were not to be used to defray the expense of
supervision or administration of the ordinance, which expense was
reduced by other fees imposed pursuant to the zoning ordinance.145
Consequently, the court stated: "Because the revenue is considera-
ble and bears no relationship to the municipal costs of either rais-
ing it or of administering the ordinance generating it, we must con-
clude the impact fee is a tax.""16 As with the Builders court, the
Manheim II court concluded that the police power under the First
Class Township Code did not authorize the imposition of such a
tax." 7 The Manheim II court, however, went one step further in
stating, "[t]here exists no statutory enabling authority for an im-
139. Manheim II, 72 Lancaster L Rev at 66; cf., 53 Pa Stat § 10503-A(b) (Purdon
Supp 1992).
140. Manheim II, 72 Lancaster L Rev at 66. With respect to the First Class Township
Code, the township relied upon sections 56510 (public safety), 56544 (health and cleanli-
ness) and 56552 (general powers) thereof. Id at 66-67.
141. See notes 95-114 and accompanying text (discussing Manheim I).
142. See Manheim II, 72 Lancaster L Rev at 66-67, 70-71.
143. Id at 67 (citation omitted).
144. Id at 68.
145. Id at 68-69; cf., id at. 70 n 6 (discussing other ways in which the ordinance quali-
fies as a tax).
146. Id at 70 (footnote omitted).
147. Id at 71. See also note 136 and accompanying text. Although the court in Build-
ers faced the police powers under the Second Class Township Code, the Manheim II court
observed that the underlying principles of both codes were the same. Manheim II, 72 Lan-
caster L Rev at 70 n 7.
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pact fee/tax on residential development. ' 148 Finally, the court de-
clared the impact fee invalid and unenforceable." 9
D. Summary and Analysis of Pennsylvania Impact Fee Caselaw
While Manheim I, Manheim If and Builders addressed impact
fees specifically targeted at transportation, now statutorily ad-
dressed by the MCI Article, those decisions establish useful param-
eters with respect to the imposition of impact fees generally. By
extracting these parameters from the cases, a better understanding
of the status of impact fees in Pennsylvania should result.
No provision of the MPC, with the sole exceptions of section
10503(11) regarding recreation impact fees, and section 10503-A(a)
regarding transportation impact fees, expressly or impliedly autho-
rizes impact fees.18 0 Further, no statutory enabling authority exists
outside of the MPC with regard to impact fees.1 51 Because impact
fees are likely to exceed the costs of raising the revenue and of
administering the ordinance giving rise to the fees, they will not be
construed by courts as regulatory fees, but rather, as taxes.8 2 As
such, they are not authorized by the general police power. 53
Without clear and explicit statutory language conferring the au-
thority to impose and collect impact fees, Pennsylvania courts are
unwilling to validate them. Bolstering this conclusion is section
10503-A(b) of the MCI Article, requiring specific authority to im-
pose impact fees. 54
CONCLUSION
The recently enacted Article V-A of the Pennsylvania Munici-
palities Planning Code, together with the Pennsylvania courts have
made it clear that specific legislative authorization is required to
enable a municipality to impose impact fees on developers.'"5 Cur-
148. Manheim II, 72 Lancaster L Rev at 71. In so stating, the court specifically took
note of the Local Tax Enabling Act, 53 Pa Stat sections 6901-6923, and the Transportation
Partnership Act, 53 Pa Stat sections 1621-1626. Id. By examining the Transportation Part-
nership Act, the Manheim II court may have partially addressed the question left open by
the Builders court. See note 136. At any rate, it is clear that the Transportation Partnership
Act does not provide the authority to impose impact fees. See Sweet and Symons, Planning
Code at 90 (cited in note 1). It is important to note that this case was decided prior to
enactment of the MCI Article.
149. Manheim II, 72 Lancaster L Rev at 73.
150. See notes 100, 104 and 128 and accompanying text.
151. See note 148 and accompanying text; see also 53 Pa Stat § 10503-A(b).
152. See notes 98-99, 134-135 and 146 and accompanying text.
153. See notes 142 and 147 and accompanying text.
154. See note 20 and accompanying text.
155. See notes 20 and 154 and accompanying text.
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rently, only two such statutory provisions exist, authorizing impact
fees for recreational facilities and for transportation. Article V-A
provides strict requirements in terms of research and reports by
the municipality prior to imposing impact fees. The standard it
employs, however, is the rational-nexus standard, which is argua-
bly a rubber-stamp. Senate Bill No 923, Session of 1989, unlike the
MCI Article, would have incorporated the specifically and uniquely
attributable standard with respect to impact fees, which is a strict
standard requiring a close fit between the impact alleged and the
development against which the impact fee is sought to be imposed.
The coupling of the Senate Bill standard with the Article V-A re-
quirements aforesaid would give rise to a law that would logically
require the many studies and reports necessitated thereunder to be
truly justified by the municipality. Until such time, however, given
the inherent weakness of the rational-nexus standard, developers
may find themselves at the mercy of goal-oriented municipalities.

